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PREFACE
This study was initiated as Subtask i, TNT Equivalency Study to NASA Study
C-11, Advan: ed Missions Safety Studies. Other studies in this series are
Subtask Z, _.fety Analysis of Parallel versus Series Propellant Loading of
the Space Shuttle (Aerospace Report No. ATR-71(7Z33)-I) and Subtask 3,
Orbiting Propellant Depot Safety Study (Aerospace Report No. ATR-71(7Z33)-3).
This study was supported by NASA Headquarters and manag_,d by the Advanced
Missions Office of the Office of Manned Space Flight. Mr. Herbert Schaefer,
the Study Monitor, supported by Mr. Charles W. Childs of the NASA Safety
Office, provided guidance and counsel that significantly aided this effort.
Study results are presented in three volumes; these volumes are summarized
as follows:
D Volume I: Management Sumrnar 7 Report presents a brief, concise
review of the study content and summarizes the principal conclusions
and recommendations.
Volume lh Technical Discussion provides a discussion of the
available test data and the data analysis. Details of an analysis
of possible vehicle static faAure 1nodes and an assessment of
their explosive potentials are included. Design and procedural
criteria are suggested to minimize the occurrence of an
explosive failure.
Volume III: Appendices contains supporting analyses and backup
mate rial.
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ABSTRACT
This study reevaluates the existing TNT equivalency criterion for LOz/LI-I 2
propell&nt. It addresses the static, on-pad phase of the space shuttle launch
operations and was performed to determine whether the use of a TNT equiv-
alency criterion lower than that presently used (60%) could be substantiated.
The large quantity of propellant on-board the space shuttle, 4 X 1 06 lb, was
considered of prime importance to the study.
Furthermore, a qualitative failure analysis of the space shuttle (EOS) on the
launch pad was made because it was concluded that available test data on the
explosive yield of LOz/LH Z propellant was insufficient to support a reduction
in the present TNT equivalency value, considering the large quantity of pro-
pellant used in the space shuttle. The failure analysis had two objectives.
The first was to determine whether a failure resulting in the total release of
(_ propellant could occur. The second was to determine whether, if such a
failure did occur, ignition could be delayed long enough to allow the degree
of propellant mixing required to produce an explosion of 600 TNT equivalency
since the explosive yield of this propellant is directly related to the quantities
of LH Z and LO 2 mixed at the time of the explosion.
The analysis indicates that the occurrence of such a failure is unlikely and
that a TNT equivalency of 20_/0 would be a more realistic value for the static,
on-pad phase of the space shuttle launch operations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The existing 60% TNT equivalency requirement for LOz/LH z propellant is
considered too conservative and too restrictive for u_e as a siting criterion
for the space shuttle program.
A reduction of this criterion would relax siting and operation_, constraints
and effect a savings in facilities costs. It therefore becomes appropriate
to review this criterion with respect to both existing test data and the results
of a failure mode analysis of the shuttle vehicle in the static, on-pad con-
figuration in order to determine whether a reduction in this criterion could be
justified.
2. STUDY OBJECTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS
Z. t OBJECTIVES
' The major objective of this study was to evaluate and recommend a new TNT
i equivalency criterion for LOz/LH z propellant for application to the static,
on-pad operational phase of the space shuttle. The new criterion is to have
as low a value as possible consistent with a reasonable level of confidence and
hazard expectation. Further, the data were to be developed in a manner that
would support a proposal to the Armed Services Explosive Safety Board
(ASESB) requesting concurrence with the recommended criterion.
2. Z CONSTRAINTS
No additional tests were conducted. Therefore, the data analysis phase of
this study was confined to the study of data produced by prior test programs.
Most of this data was found not to be pertinent to this study.
r
! Design and operational criteria for the space shuttle were in the development
i phase; the failure analysis was therefore a gross, top-level effort. A further
i
i
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reduction in recommended criteria may become possible as vehicle design
progresses and detailsbecome more fullydefined.
3. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER NASA EFFORTS
The results of this study have a direct impact on several areas of the space
shuttleprogram. The most significantof these are the following:
• Identificationof hardware design areas and of interface
and operational constraints that should be considered
to minimize both the probabi:_ityof failureand the
explosive potentialshould s,_cha failureoccur
• Development of _he norm_l operational and contingency
safety plans
• Estab!ishment of facilJ*.iesrequirements to aid the
Space ShuttleFacilitiesGroup in its site selection
efforts
(
4, METHOD OF APPROACH
The general plan followed in this study was to:
• Collect and analyze existing data
• Perform failure mode analyses
• Evaluate and recommend new criterJ.a
5. RESULTS
5.1 GENERAL
Since this study was designed primarily to support the site selection and
_ facilities planning activities, it was confined to the static, on-pad phase of
!
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operations, i.e., the time interval between the start of propellant loading and
launch, including any hold time.
The vehicle configuration _nd proyellant weights used throughout the study
are those shown in Fig. i.
5.2 DATA ANALYSIS
5.2. i Principal Investigator_
The principal investigators whose test data and/_,rreports were selected for
analysis are the following:
• A.D. Little,Inc.
• Aerojet General Corp.
• Bellcomm, Inc.
• National Aeronautics and Space £_dministration
• University of Florida
( • URS Corp. (Project Pyro)
5.2.2 Definition of Explosive Yield
Explosive yield is defined:
Yield (% TNT) = Equivalent _Veight of TNT × 100Total Propellant Weight
5.2.3 Available Test Data
A summary of test data from the ma_or LO2/LH 2 propellant test prokrams is
presented in Table 1. Most of these tests were conducted with propella"
quantities of 225 lb or less; only 18 tests are reported for propellant
weights in the 1000 to 91,000-1b range.
1972004136-011
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180ft
235ft
_J IlOft
L 150ft
J.
WEIGHTDATA,Ibx 106 BOOSTERORBITER
i
GROSSLIFTOFFWEIGHT 4.2 0.8
TOTALLOADEDPROPELLANT 3.4 0.6
L02 2.9 0.5
LH2 0.5 0. I
NOTE:DIMENSIONSANDWEIGHTSAREAPPROXIMATE
Fig. i. Typical Vehicle Configuration
I
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5. Z.4 Data Selected for Analysis
Only Project Pyro reports provide test data for propellant test weights in
excess of ZZ5 lb; the largest was 91,000 lb. Pyro data were therefore
selected as the basis for the analysis. Data from the spill and the contact-
type tests were excluded from the final analysis. The configurations and
objectives of these tests were not considered representative of potential
space shuttle failures.
5.Z. 5 Data Indications
Itis indicated in Table I that explosive yields vary over a wide range. The
data indicate a trend towards a smaller range and a lower maximul_-yield
value as propellant test weights increase. This downward trend may be
questioned, however, since itis based on significantly fewer tests and test
configurations than were employed in the small-scale tests.
5.Z. 6 Data Evaluation
('_ The available test data do not define the explosive yields of LOz/LH z pro-
pellant in sufficient detail to support a recommendation for a generalized re-
duction in the existing 60_0 TNT equivalency criterion; therefore a failure
analysis was performed.
5.3 FAILURE ANALYSIS
5.3. I Fault Tree
Figure Z presents the top of the fault tree. The tree was developed to a level
sufficient to identify failures that could lead to the release and possible ignition
of propellant. Typical conditions analyzed are listed below:
• Tank overpressure
• Tank collapse
• Orbiter dropped
• Vehicle tipover
• Lightning strike
• Fire _
( • Tank struck by foreign object
• Vehicle propellant system failure
-6-
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Fig. Z. Fault Tree - Top Level
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5.3. Z Assessment of Explosive Potential
5.3. Z. 1 Existing Criterion
The existing 60% TNT equivalency criterion is based on the total weight of
propellant on-board the vehicle. In addition, it assumes a total release and
mixing of the LO Z and LH Z prior to ignition.
5.3. Z. Z Multiple Tank Failures
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the main propulsion propellant on-board
'_ne space shuttle. If one assumes that a multiple failure of these tanks were
to occur and that ignition could be delayed long enough to produce a TNT ex-
plosive yield equivalency of 60% of the weight of the propellant spilled, then
the yields shown in Table Z might be obtained. However, the analysis indi-
cates that the simultaneous failure of multiple tanks is an extremely remote
possibility, particularly in combinations involving both vehicles. Further,
the analysis demonstrates that the nature of many of the ignition sources
_ precludes a delay sufficient for appreciable mixing prior to ignition. There-
fore, the resulting yields should be low.
Table Z. Explosive Yield for Some Tank Failures
Propellant 1
Released, Yield Ratio,
Source No. Tanks 106 lb % TNT
Orbiter Total 32 0.6 9.0
1
All Except Booster LO 2 4 !. i i 6.5
Booster Total Z 3.4 51.0
Vehicle Total 5 4.0 60.0
tYield Ratio = 0.6 X WeiNbt of Propellant Released x 100
Total Propellant Weight
|
ZOrbiter May Have Three Separate Tanks or One Tank with Common
Bulkhead
4\ _
._. _
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BOOSTER ORBITER
2,9 x I06 Ib
Lu,_ O.I x 1061b
! .5 x iO61b*
Lrlo
( ! 0.5 x 106 Ib
.... TOTAL0.6 x 106Ib
• 0.25 x 106Ib .,
TOTAL3.4x I06 Ib PERTANK
Fig. 3. Propellant Distribution
(
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5.3. Z. 3 Single Tank Failures
The analysis shows that single tank failures resulting in gross propellant
release are also unlikely. However, should a single tank failure occur, the
most critical would be the failure of the LH z tanks. If one assumes that such
a gross failure were to occur in either the booster or the orbiter LH z tank
(with a 60% TNT equivalency), the maximum yield would correspond to 7.5%
of the total weight of propellant on-board the vehicles for a booster failure
and I. 5% for an orbiter failure. The explosiol from these single tank failures
could rupture additional tanks and release their propellant. Since the fire
produced by the initial failure would provide a nearly instantaneous ignition
source, mixing time for the seconda_'y propellant release would be very short,
and a correspondingly low explosive yield would result. Most of the propellant
released in the secondary failL,re would probably only add to the magnitude
of the existing fire.
5.3.2.4 Vehicle Propellant System Leakage
i4 Accumulation of GH Z due to leakage in the vehicle propellant system can
result in low-energy explosions. These explosions could rupture adjacent
propellant tanks and result in relatively high-order secondary explosions.
=,_ A leak-detection system coupled with, a GN Z purge system capable of main-
taining the minimum suggested GNz/GH z ratio (see Table 3)will inhibit
explosions due to GH z leakage. This assumes that the system purges the
areas in which leakage nlight occur to a minimum 95% GN z atmosphere prior
to propellant loading. It also assumes that the GH z from maximum allowable
leakage of all components is uniformly dispersed.
Table 3. Suggested Minimum GNz/GH 2 Ratio to Inhibit Explosion
Constituent Vol % Wt %
GN 2 65 97.3
GH 2 3 5 3.7
i -I0-
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6. CONCLUSIONS
The failure analysis indicates that 20% TNT equivalency is a realistic value
for the space shuttle during the static,on-pad phase of operations. However,
the existing test data are considered insufficient to support a recommendation
for a generalized reduction in the current explosive hazard crlterion for
LOz/LH 2 propellant. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the
final vehicle configuration will be similar to the one analyzed.
7. SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL EFFORT
The desirability of additional testing at high propellant test weights should be
considered. A cost study is suggested to assess the cost vs return of such a
test program. If feasible, an in-depth test plan should be developed to assure
( the maximum data return for the minimum testing.
Itmay become appropriate to reevaluate this study when the vehicle design
: becomes firm. Such an analysis might result in a lower TNT equivalency
value for the space shuttle than can be substantiated at this time.
-ii-
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